One of the most outstanding features of making politics in a shrinking world and interdependent economies is the creation of "International Policy Regimes" (IPR) for the governance of "micro" arenas of international politics. This is a stimulating development for comparative public policy analysts as it enables (and requires) us to extend our traditional cross-national, cross-sectorial and cross-issue analyses so as to include also a cross-international analysis. This paper compares two international policy regimes for the regulation of international competition in the sector of telecommunications. The first regime deals with the regulation of terminal equipment (type-approval processes) and the second with network interconnection (the integration of different and competing networks into one system). While the terminal type-approval regime involves deregulation, and was found to be narrow in scope and fairly effective, the network interconnection regime involves reregulation and was found to be broad in scope and relatively weak. These variations are particularly interesting because they refer to "most similar cases". They were shaped by the same actors, at around the same time, and with respect to same policy problem and the same sector. The paper suggests that these variations in the regulation of international competition are best explained by juxtaposing the "policy determine politics" approach to the "politics determines policy" approach.
The Governance of International Telecommunications Competition

Cross-International Study of International Policy Regimes
One of the most outstanding features of making politics in a shrinking world and interdependent economies is the creation of "International Policy Regimes" (IPR) for the governance of "micro" arenas of international politics. The conclusion of the WTO telecommunications accord and the initialing of the Mutual Recognition Agreement between the European Union and the United States in 1997 have been created such an
International Policy Regimes. Places where only 'order', 'disorder' and 'international regimes' existed before are now becoming arenas of making policy. This is a stimulating development for the field of comparative public policy as it enables (or requires) us to extend the traditional cross-national, cross-sectorial, and cross-issue analyses so as to include also cross-international analysis. Some progress in this regard has been made by literature on the domestication of international relations and the internationalization of domestic politics (Putnam, 1988; Gourevitch, 1978 Gourevitch, , 1996 Katzenstein, 1978 Katzenstein, , 1985 Evans, Jacobson & Putnam 1993; Keohane and Milner, 1996) . Another strand of this literature concerns issues of multi-governance in the context of the European Union policy making (Peters, 1992; Bulmer, 1994; Huelshoff, 1994; Peterson, 1995; Richardson, 1996; Grande, 1996; Kohler-Koch, 1996) . There are also efforts to conceptualize globalization and internationalization in the framework of the policy communities/policy networks literature (Rhodes, 1996; Coleman and Perl, 1997 ). Yet an interdependent world results not only in a two-way interactions between the domestic and the international but also in distinct and autonomous (yet still interdependent) policy arenas at the international level. Where and when such policy arenas exist comparative public policy, alongside international relations and international political economy, may have an important contribution to make in explaining policy processes and outcomes.
For more than a century, since the invention of the telephone in 1876, the international telecommunications order was dominated by implicit economic nationalism.
Institutionalized international coordination, in the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), was efficient but very strict as it legitimated the distinct national controls over telecommunications (Cowhey, 1990) . As the industry was considered a 'natural monopoly' it was perceived unsuitable for competition. Hierarchically structured national telephony networks were the dominant form for the governance of telecommunications and only a limited number of closely monitored gateways allowed interconnection between distinct national networks. The old telecommunications order is now undergoing transformation which is leading it away from the old forms of economic nationalism. The 'natural monopoly' characteristics of the telecommunication sector are increasingly being eroded and competition is become ever more prevalent. The old international regime which respected (and legitimated) the independence of the national telecommunications authorities is now increasingly under challenge.
The new international telecommunications, which is more competitive than ever before, gave birth, in the first half of 1997, to two international policy regimes which will most probably be remembered as turning points in the history of international competition in telecommunications. They were formed and shaped by close cooperation between the EU and the United States, which may indicate the strengthening of transatlantic cooperation which may be extended and reflected in other issues and sectors in the future. Most The international policy regime for terminal type-approval aims at facilitating the introduction of telecommunications terminals to the market by coordinating approval procedures of different national authorities. Approval procedures involve stages such as the setting of standards, technical examination for compatibility to the national network, and certification. They usually aim at ensuring public control over features such as quality, service, safety, network protection, and inter-operability of telecommunications equipment. Like many other regulations, type-approval procedures are also prone to both excessive and permissive demands. The manufacturers of equipment often complain about the costs in both time and money involved in type-approval procedures. For example, it was recently argued by the giant telecom manufacturer Ericsson that "the lifecycle of a mobile phone is 18 month or less, and yet it currently takes around three months to get the product approved..." 2 . In addition, manufacturers often complain about the need to duplicate these tests in different countries. Such requirements are in effect barriers to market competition and it does not really matter (from this point of view)
whether these procedures are genuine tools for ensuring public safety or specific social goods, or implicit projectionist tools: either way they would have to be coordinated across national jurisdictions in order to minimize the costs of trading in different countries.
The international policy regime for network interconnection regulates the procedures of the integration of different telecommunication networks into one system. Interconnection allows an end-user with one type of telephony equipment to interconnect with another who uses the network of a different telecommunications services provider equipped with another type of telephony. Interconnection between similar technological systems (e.g., two different telephone networks) or even between technologically dissimilar networks (e.g., telephone and internet telephony or mobile and fixed telephony) allows for competition. As will be demonstrated in the next part of the paper, the competition between different network operators largely depends on an effective interconnection regime. The enforcement of rules for interconnection requires governments to be engaged in asymmetric regulation, namely to deliberately favor the interests of new entrants over those of the monopoly providers; to set rules for such regimes; and to act as an arbiter in an ongoing struggle between different network operators over the conditions and costs of access to each other's network.
The international accords which created these regimes are wider in scope than the specific policy regime we study here. The MRAs were negotiated and initialed by the European Union not only with the United States but also, again on a bilateral basis, with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The MRAs cover telecommunications equipment and also medical devices, pharmaceuticals, electromagnetic computability, and electrical safety. Similarly, the WTO telecommunications accord covers network interconnection and also such matters as market access and universal service. The decision to focus on the interconnection component of the accord reflects its critical importance for liberalization (cf. Bronckers and Larouche, 1997, 28) . Similar considerations led to the examination of the MRA between the European Union and the United States: "Because of their dominant position in the global economy, whenever the US and the EU agree on regulatory policies and procedures, many other nations are likely to adopt them as well. In effect, they become de facto global standards" (Vogel, 1997,1) .
While the literature of international relations dealt extensively with the preconditions of successful international cooperation, the comparative study of the regimes themselves received much less attention. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the potential contribution of cross-international policy analysis to the study of globalization and internationalization. The two regimes are similar in the timing of their creation, and they both (a) aim at creating a more competitive environment for telecommunications; (b) were created outside the traditional policy community which was structured around the International Telecommunications Union; (c) involve significant participation of large businesses directly or through trade associations and peak organizations; and (d) were critically shaped by the European Union and the United States. They differ however in three important respects: (a) while the terminal type-approval regime involves deregulation for competition, the network interconnection regime involves regulation for competition; (b) while the terminal type-approval regime is an effective regime, the network interconnection regime is a weak regime; and, (c) while the terminal typeapproval regime is limited in scope (bilateral), the network interconnection regime is broad (multilateral). The comparative study of politics in general and of public policy in particular is a study of structured variations. Thus, this paper aims to provide an explanation for the variations in these two policy regimes.
The explanation will focus not on the preconditions for international cooperation (the traditional subject of interest for international relations) but on the structure of the new policy regimes, so it will highlight some important aspects of state-society relations in policy arenas which go through a process of globalization and internationalization.
Because of the variations in the structure of these regimes the next part of the paper characterizes the differences between these two international policy regimes. We then proceed by offering two complementary explanations for the variations in them. We suggest that it is useful to approach these variations by combining the politics determines policy approach with the policy determines politics approach (Lowi, 1964 (Lowi, , 1970 (Lowi, , 1972 Freeman, 1986) . While the first approach looks into the interplay of state, international institutions, and business as the generators of political order, the second suggests that certain inherent features of the policy problem may explain much or at least some of the more important aspects of the outcomes.
I. Structural variations across international policy regimes
One crucial condition for realizing the potential advantages of comparative public policy in the analysis of politics at the international level is that we bridge the conceptual gaps between international relations and comparative public policy. To do this, it is necessary to distinguish "international orders", "international regimes" and "policy regimes".
International orders are broad structures which reflect social, political, and economic practices that are only moderately characterized by implicit or explicit rules (cf. Young, 1989; Hasenclever et al, 1997; Breckinridge, 1997) . International regimes are "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner, 1983, 2) .
While international orders are broad, encompassing a wide variety of activities and including most, if not all, of the actors of the international arena, international regimes are more specific, relating to well-defined activities and characterized by a distinct and relatively stable policy network (cf. Breckinridge, 1997, 174-5) .
The rise of international regime analysis is intimately connected to the growing economic interdependence in the world economy. A growing awareness of economic interdependence has caused students of international relations since the mid-1970s to use the concept of 'international regimes' to ask questions about the determinants of international cooperation, its limits, and its implications (Ruggie, 1975; Keohane and Nye, 1977) . When students of international relations used the notion of "regime" to specify a more concrete and narrow arena of political action, they begin to close the gaps between their sphere of study, and that of their colleagues in the field of comparative public policy. Yet, in order to bridge the gap further, the notion of 'policy regime' as against that of 'international regime' should be clarified. The study of international policy regimes is similar to that of national and sectorial policy regimes in respect of the extent of political regulation and political control over business.
As mentioned above, the two international policy regimes that are compared here differ in this respect. While the international policy regime for type-approval enforces deregulation, the international policy regime for network interconnection leads to more regulations in the international and national arenas. The deregulatory tendencies of the former are an outcome of a concrete effort by policy makers and regulators to move from the relatively easy administration of tariff reduction and tariff elimination towards the more complex task of removing technical barriers to trade such as the different national standards and procedures for type-approval.
In most countries, the approval of the connection of terminals to the public network was conditioned, before liberalization, on the agreement of the domestic Telecommunications
Operator (TO). These would most often use their approval prerogative to establish de facto a monopoly on the provision of telephony (and to a more limited extent, of other terminals as well). By creating a closed and small network of (usually national) suppliers or alternatively by manufacturing terminals for captive public, and by bundling the supply of equipment with the supply of telecommunications services, TOs reaped easy revenues (OECD, 1985; . With the liberalization of the telecommunications markets, the elimination of the TO's monopoly over telecommunications equipment became the first priority of the regulators. Even in the heyday of the 'natural monopoly' paradigm, the TOs' strategy of bundling equipment with services could hardly be justified in terms of "natural monopoly" or economics of scale. Yet it took the Federal Communications Commission in the United States over four decades to make headway in breaking the AT&T monopoly by introducing in 1976 simplified procedures for the registration of terminal equipment (Wallenstein, 1990; Bickers, 1991) . These procedures allowed the connection of any terminal to AT&T network, provided that it would not harm the network and would be registered by the FCC. Thus, it ensured that the FCC, and not AT&T, would approve the marketing and connectivity of terminals.
The FCC procedures for terminal approval do not eliminate or prevent variations in the regulation of different products, or the fragmentation of rules between different states and areas of the US. Nor do they prevent stricter demands of high-voltage and radioequipment terminals (which involve more risks in terms of safety) 4 . Nevertheless, the American procedures for terminal type-approval are probably the most lenient in regard to the introduction of new telecommunications equipment. For despite over a decade of liberalization, harmonization, and integration, the European regime for type-approval is still highly fragmented according to the diverse requirements of the member states; at the European level and the state level it imposes stricter demands than those in the United
States. The European situation somewhat reflects late development in the regulation of competition due the common organization of telephone services as a governmental service (Noam, 1992) . While in the United States, the issue of competition in the telecommunications equipment market had been handled by judicial and regulatory authorities from the 1940s, in Europe it became the subject of governments' liberalization efforts only in the 1980s and 1990s. These efforts were made in the context of corporatization and privatization at the national level and the promotion of a common telecommunications policy at the European level (see, CEC, 1987; Schneider et al., 1994;  Levi-Faur, forthcoming).
The new European procedures for the regulation of terminal approval that have been designed since the mid-1980s are still only partially Europe-wide and largely reflect national standards and requirements. In principle, the process of type-approval is managed according to European standards and procedures, and includes full mutual recognition of standards, testing, and certification among the member-states (Council, 1991) . In practice, the manufacturers of terminal equipment are able to certify their products for Europe-wide certification only where the European Union's official standards organization, ETSI, has issued Common Technical Regulations (CTRs). Since the creation of CTRs proves to be a cumbersome and slow process, at least 75% of the market and products are still governed by national regulations 5 . Still, the European-level and the national-level regimes for type-approval are experiencing a gradual process of privatization and deregulation. At the level of the Union and of the member states there is tendency to transfer the testing of equipment to private (yet "recognized") laboratories and even to allow 'notified bodies' to grant certifications 6 . At the same time, the harmonization of CTRs aims to introduce very basic requirements: health, safety, and prevention of damage to the networks. This means that the manufacturers have more freedom while the scope of state officials in establishing standards becomes narrower.
The initialing of the Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) between the European
Union and the United States in June 1997 promises to make the regulatory process even easier for the manufacturers of equipment. The MRA ensures that a product tested and approved by one party, according to the other party's quality and safety standards, will be approved for sale without having to undergo another round of certification procedures.
The principle that governs the new regime is "approved once and accepted everywhere in the new transatlantic marketplace" 7 . Thus, the MRA promises to cut down the time it now takes to launch new products and to reduce their cost. Unlike harmonization, which was the alternative road for the creation of an integrated transatlantic type-approval regime 8 , mutual recognition does not involve transfer of powers from the parties to an international governing body. While the parties are obliged to mutually respect the testing and the certification stages, they have retained their independence in the setting of standards. In other words, they avoided the alternative road of creating one regulatory body for certification, common transatlantic testing authority, and common standards.
The overall deregulatory effect of the MRA is therefore felt less in the elimination of rules than it is in the elimination of bureaucratic instances in the process of typeapproval. New political and international regulatory organizations have not been set up, while at the same time the shortening of the number of testing and certification procedures will create a de facto 'one stop' certification and testing authority. Without lowering the standards (Delaware effect), then, the MRA seems to have made the process of type-approval more efficient (on Delaware effect, see, Vogel, 1995) .
In contrast to the terminal equipment regime, the dynamics of the international regime for network interconnection is towards strengthening the national and the international regulatory regimes. Rather than deregulate, the WTO mechanisms for enforcement of competition and liberalization of markets involve the creation of new regulatory functions rather than their elimination. The telecommunications accord was shaped as in the context of the extension of the old international trade regime from goods to services within the framework of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that was signed in
Marrakech was a successful conclusion of eight years of negotiations (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , and led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization instead of GATT. The new trade order for services covered only minor aspects of the telecommunications industry.
The critical issue of network liberalization was delegated to a special voluntary forum of the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT) which first met in 1994.
After the negotiators failed to reach the first pre-agreed deadline for an accord on telecommunications, a second deadline was met in February 1997.
Three major obstacles had to be removed during the negotiations in order to promote competition in the international arena. The first obstacle concerns restraints on market access for foreign telecommunications providers. While the state's legal monopoly on the telecommunications wires is increasingly cut down, restrictions on market access of foreign companies still exist in many, if not most, countries (OECD, 1995) . These restrictions include straightforward limits on foreign ownership, but also more 'moderate' restrictions such as limits on market share and special licensing. Following the negotiations, most of the signatories to the accord made commitments to cancel the restrictions. The second obstacle to competitive supply of telecommunications is the ITU's accounting rate system, which allows for a monopoly provision of international calls. This system results in rates for the consumers are far higher than the costs of the providers 9 . The telecommunications accord does not deal with this issue and does not directly challenge the role of the ITU, yet it allows the establishment of competitive networks with countries, and the re-sale of leased lines. But it allows companies to bypass the international accounting rate system by using their own facilities, and de facto contributes to a regime change (Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag, 1997) .
The third obstacle to competitive provision of telecommunications connections concerns the regulation of network interconnection. This obstacle promises to create a dynamics of international reregulation, rather than deregulation, for two main reasons. The first derives from the ambition to create a level playing field for international competition while the second derives from the need of regulators to be engaged in 'asymmetric regulation'. The ambition to create a level playing field for international competition, between TOs takes the form of a deliberate effort to "develop a world-wide set of competition rules" (Holmes et al., 1996, 765) . To promote its goals, the accord on telecommunications aims to supply "competitive safeguards" against practices such as cross-subsidization. It also requires that the interconnection between competing TOs will be (a) ensured "at any technically feasible point in the network"; and (b) will be provided "under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical standards and specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favorable than that provided for its own like services" 10 .
This accord is probably the first instance in the history of world trade in which elements of 'competition law' were integrated within an international trade agreement. As against the limited goal of 'mutual recognition' of the terminal type-approval regime, the interconnection regime aims at 'harmonizing' the conditions for international telecommunications competition. It is therefore not surprising that commentators concluded that the telecommunications negotiators have "made a brave gamble" (Holmes et al., 1996, 765) . The harmonization of a business environment instead of a product environment is very complicated. The telecommunications accord suggests that it will be carried out by independent national regulatory authorities. With this provision it offers the most explicit example of regulations for the international arena being applied to the domestic one. Yet the effects of the accord, and the regulation for competition that it carries, appear to go well beyond this measure. It seems rather unrealistic to expect that the tensions between the anticipation of a competitive global economy on the one hand and the reality of nationally-and regionally-fragmented economies on the other could be balanced by national regulators. Bona fide, let alone intentional, failure to regulate for competition will most probably result in trade frictions on the one hand and legitimate the creation of International Competition Policy on the other (cf. Scherer, 1994; Cable and Distler, 1995; Doren and Wilks, 1996) . Such an authority, whether general or sectorial (namely limited to the telecommunications sector itself) would mean the creation of a global FCC (or OFTEL) and therefore a regulatory, rather than a deregulatory, regime.
A second reason why the current regime promises to create regulatory structure in the international arena, and thus a stronger control over business, is that it requires 'asymmetric regulation'. In contrast to the principle of one equal law, asymmetric (Weare, 1996; Bickers, 1991; Hulsink, 1996) . Part of the problem lies in the difficulty of establishing cost-sensitive principles to find the market values of each component of the network. There is no definitive and exclusive approach what the optimal interconnection price should be (Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers, 1996; Laffont, Rey, and Tirole, 1997) . Because no market exists for either networks or calls, any decision regarding pricing involves some measure of arbitrariness.
The decision on "fair" costs often falls into the hands of the regulators. Thus, the liberalization of the telecommunications networks creates the paradox of more rules for more competition (cf. Vogel S., 1996) . Instead of a cup-regulation regime, in which regulators in monopoly era set the ceiling of the price of calls for the users, we may end now with cup-regulations for interconnection of calls between different TOs.
The study of international policy regimes differs from that of national and sectorial policy regimes in that it often necessitates discussion of two important dimensions: the scope of the regime and its effectiveness. To some extent these dimensions have equivalents on the national and sectorial levels. A regime's scope in the international arena has its parallel in the exclusion and inclusion of groups and actors in the literature of policy networks. Similarly, the notion of a regime's effectiveness may taken as the counterpart of the issue of implementation in public administration and public policy. As claimed above, however, some important variations are found between the two regimes regarding the extent of their regulation and regarding their scope and effectiveness. In what follows, I shall suggest that while the international type-approval regime is bilateral and effective, the network interconnection regime is multilateral and much less effective.
Scope is a sensitive issue in the international trade regime. Much of this sensitivity has to do with the bilateral Nazi trade policy during the interwar period which was used as a discriminatory and power device against small states (Ruggie, 1993) . In contrast to the international interconnection regime, the international terminal typeapproval regime is a bilateral one. International regime theory tends often to discuss the strength of a regime rather than its effectiveness. A regime's strength is identified with the compliance mechanisms which it has or the extent to which its institutions constrain state's behavior (Kahler, 1995, 3) .
Strength is often measured in a formal manner, with regard to the place awarded to monitoring and to enforcement or the degree to which formal institutions dominate within the overall design (Ibid.). For reasons that will be elaborated below I find this approach to the measurement of regime strength flawed. Instead, I shall suggest that "regime effectiveness", a concept used also by regime theorists, is a better tool for comparative public policy. Thus, a regime is effective "to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules… [and] …to the extent that it achieves certain objectives or fulfills certain purposes" (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997, 2).
Using this definition of regime effectiveness I argue that though the MRA includes weaker guarantees for compliance, the type-approval regime is considerably more effective than the network interconnection regime. The compliance mechanisms of the MRA rests on a sectorial joint committee and unanimous decision making procedures (article 14). Either of the parties to the agreement may suspend its obligations if the other fails to fulfill its obligation, or does not recognize the other's conferment assessment bodies, or fails to maintain legal and regulatory authorities capable of implementing the agreement's provisions (article 16). As against the MRA's reliance on joint committees, the compliance mechanism of the telecommunications accord is ensured by the improved WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Disputes are resolved by panels composed of independent experts which have to render their decisions within nine months at most.
Appeals are discussed by a standing appellate body of legal experts. Refusal to comply with the panel's decision allows the winning party to retaliate by suspending its WTO commitments as to goods or services of comparable value. Thus, the judicial and independent character of the WTO dispute settlement promises, on the face of it, more compliance than the joint committees of the MRA do.
While a formal-legalistic approach to the study of regimes would conclude that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is stronger than the MRA's, a policy approach would lead to the conclusion that the MRA regime is much more effective and therefore, in effect, stronger. The challenges which the WTO dispute settlement mechanism will face with respect to the implementation of the regulation for fair competition in different national settings are enormous. "However effective and quick the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism may be, it may still be insufficient for disputes in the field of telecommunications" (Bronckers and Larouche, 1997, 41). The fact that the interconnection requirements of the US 1996 Telecommunications Act, and the European interconnection rules as formulated by the Interconnection Directive, are much more detailed and strict than the rules formulated by the telecommunications accord makes the job of the dispute-settlement panels very tricky indeed 11 . All in all, because it faces such challenges, and because its compliance mechanisms are insufficient, the international policy regime for network interconnection is much less effective than the MRA regime.
II. Explaining Cross-International Structural Variations: Politics vs. Policy?
The significance of the variations between the two regimes should be established for what they may tell us about the dynamics of change in international telecommunications.
Two aspects are critical in this regard for the analysis of change: first the balance between the power of state and non-state actors in its effects on policy outcomes and second the limits that political actors face in determining policy outcomes. The most important political actors in shaping the two international telecommunications policy regimes of network interconnection and terminal type-approval were states and businesses and, indeed, the variations in their structures may be explained by differences in the power of these actors in the two policy arenas. Following this kind of investigation and reasoning, we assume that it is politics that determines the policy outcomes (and therefore also the variations in the two IPRs). One may argue that the active and regulatory role of the state in the international policy regime for network interconnection suggests success of state actors (namely, nation states and the European Commission) in enforcing their control over businesses in the context of regime transformation. By contrast, the deregulatory tendencies in the type-approval regimes may be taken to suggest that the state is in retreat.
Indeed, the contradictory regulatory tendencies in these international policy regimes qualify generalizations concerning the power of the state. On the evidence of reregulation and its critical importance in the process of liberalization one should reject the assertion (which has become almost common wisdom) that the telecommunications sector provides an "extreme example of one process by which authority has shifted massively away from the governments of states to the corporate management of firms" (Strange, 1996, 100) . tell us anything about the decline or the rise of a party's autonomy. Indeed, in the case of our two international policy regimes, losses in the independent decision-making capacity of the parties were first compensated by (expected) gains in economic efficiency and prosperity, and then by legitimization of the political control of business. Having lost or relinquished their old roles in cup-regulation and administration of telephone services, states now tend towards the supervision, enforcement, and promotion of competition.
These new roles are no less demanding, sophisticated, or critical for social welfare than the old one. The margin of discretion left for the regulators of network competition is no less wide than that which they enjoyed before. The decline in the state's administrative capacities (its commodification function as service provider) seems to be compensated by the rise of its regulatory powers with respect to competition (cf. Cerny, 1990; .
A new governance structure for the liberalization of international telecommunications is thus under consolidation. In the case of network interconnection, this structure, which may lead to a more competitive environment, involves the institution of more rules for the establishment of freer markets. More rules will also be necessary to broaden of the scope of the international policy regime for terminal type-approval. The enlargement of the MRAs so as to include more than the handful of very rich economies would require the creation of trustworthy regulatory regimes in those other countries as well. Because the credibility of testing and certification rests on the state's regulatory capacities (rather than on an international organization) the promotion of such capacities beyond the exclusive club of Western countries is a precondition for broadening the type-approval regime. In addition, it might well be that the creation of a stronger competition regime for network interconnection will require the creation of an "international competition policy"
and a "global competition regulator". Such regulatory rules and agency at the international level reassert the suggestion that more competition and more rules are not necessarily contradictory.
Business, especially big business, has often actively supported the introduction of competition to the telecommunications sector. Telecommunications has become a strategic feature of the economy, and better and cheaper services are the key to national and private competitiveness. For example, a study of the telecommunications expenses of large users in France found that their monthly bills reached $US 11,800, as compared to around one sixth of this sum for small corporation and $US 28 for residential users (Benzoni and Svider, 1994, 240) . In an era in when the use of telecommunications is constantly on the rise, business has a direct and strong incentive to push for more competition and for further rate reductions. Thus, the welfare of business (or its competitiveness) was one important goal of the liberalization of telecommunications, in particular as regards the easing of controls on terminal approvals and the promotion of competition among TOs. While business actors in the telecommunications sector are divided into big and small, manufacturers and operators, users and service providers, long-distance and local providers, etc., they were almost generally united in their support for liberalization. Even the TOs themselves, which are the obvious "victims" of competition, and acted to slow it, expressed their support for liberalization 13 .
One of the indications of business power in the telecommunications sector is the high degree of associational activity in Washington and Brussels, the two centers where critical decisions were made during the negotiations about the two regimes.
Telecommunications operators have traditionally lobbied directly in Washington and their activity there intensified in the 1990s (Kirk, 1995) . The rise of a Europe-wide telecommunications regime turned Brussels into a similar center of business lobbying from the mid-1980s (Schneider, 1992; Schneider et al., 1994) . In addition to direct releases. An even more important player, which was a direct participant in the policy process resulting in the initialing of the MRAs, is, however, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). The TABD brings together over 100 CEO-level business leaders from Europe and the United States and aims at contributing to the creation of a "new transatlantic market place". The TABD is said to "draw its force from the ability of American and European business leaders to agree jointly on recommendations and speak as one voice to governments". Since the first meeting of the TABD in Seville, Spain in 1995, it held one more general meeting in Chicago in 1996. A third meeting of this business "House of
Lords" was held in 1997 in Rome. The TABD is co-chaired by a European and an American; it is unique in both the extent to which it represents government-business cooperation and in the personal involvement of CEOs in its operation. The gathering of the Great 100 is an impressive indication of the growth in the power of big business and their increasing sophistication as political actors. The TABD considered the MRAs as a top priority in its working program for both 1996 and 1997 and followed their progress closely through a sectorial working-group.
The close involvement of the TABD in making the MRAs and the crowded and intense lobbying of business in the telecommunications sector provide a convenient starting point for a business-centered explanation for the creation of the new international telecommunications policy regimes. Indeed, the case of telecommunications clearly represents the growing importance of business as a political actor. For all that, a businesscentered explanation has limited force. There are significant differences in the two cases.
Business was much less active and had a lesser degree of success in the WTO negotiations than in the MRAs, where through the TABD it had direct access to negotiators. These differences did not seem to result in a better deal for business. The limited scope of the MRAs regime and the weakness of the network interconnection regime both point to the limits of business in the removal of technical barriers to trade and in securing 'competitive safeguards'.
One indication of political power is the ability to set the agenda. Business in both cases
was not an agenda-making actor. Even in the case of the MRAs, where the TABD had privileged access to the decision process, the initialing of the MRA regime was in the hands of the governments. Agenda setting in the case of the MRA is better explained by the EU's increasing awareness to the importance of non-tariff trade barriers for economic integration and by joint study of the EU Commission and the US Department of Commerce 14 than by long-term or even medium-term political strategy of business. While telecommunications businesses are important actors, they do not equal governments in autonomy, legitimacy, or effectiveness. Whatever political power business enjoys stems much more from its economic command of investment, trade, and know-how, which produce jobs and ensure affluence, than from the day-to-day struggle in the political and policy arenas (cf. Poulantzas, 1973; Lindblom, 1977) . This view of the telecommunications regulatory process "beyond the nation-state" supports similar conclusions by David Vogel's study of EU-US cooperation and conflict in seven regulatory areas. While Vogel acknowledges the importance of patterns of economic activity in smoothing EU-US regulatory relations (mainly through the dominant role of FDI and intra-firm trade as compared with export of final products) he minimizes the role of business activity in creating the transatlantic economy and preventing trade disputes (Vogel, 1997, 59 ).
It is now plausible to argue that a close examination of governments and their preferences are more important than a direct study of business as a political actor. This does not mean that the study of business politics is unimportant and should be neglected; on the contrary, the multi-level study of business and government certainly does promise to shed participation" (Rakoff and Schaefer, 1970, 51; see also Freeman, 1985) . Another insight which has added its own critical contribution to evidence on the limits of politics is offered in a seminal review article by Lowi (1964) . Criticizing the pluralist picture of the role of business in trade policy offered by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) , Lowi suggested that the extent of pluralism they found is a function of the 'policy arena' they chose to study. Reversing the direction of causality, he suggested that it is the nature of political issues that determines the form of interest representation and general distribution of power 16 . He went on to distinguish three major categories of policies: distribution, regulation, and redistribution. The extent of conflict and conflict repression, he argued, would change from one kind of policy to the other (see also his later studies: Lowi, 1970 Lowi, , 1972 . Taking into account the findings of the early quantitative study of comparative public policy as well as Lowi's insights requires us to monitor the effects of different policy characteristics on the variations in the structure of the two regimes. Below, the policy problem, the policy style, and the policy learning explanations are offered as an alternative to actor-based and power-seeking explanations of the 'politics determines policy' approach. The common denominator of these three explanations is that they look into the policy arena itself, rather than into the power of actors, in order to explain the outcomes.
Variations in a regime's structure may result from differences in product's propensity to competition, in other words from their vulnerability to anti-competitive behavior. The difference between the cases of network interconnection and terminal type-approval is that traffic on "grid systems" such as telephony (as well as electricity and railways) is more vulnerable to competition than telecommunications equipment is. This vulnerability can also be conceptualized with reference to a product's 'length'. In a "long" product the chain between the producer and the consumer includes many "veto points" which make it easier for various actors to hinder competition and extract easy economic rents. In "short" products, by contrast, the chain between the producer and the consumer is shorter and has less veto points. The liberalization of long products is therefore likely to be more problematic than that of short products. Following this line of reasoning it is argueable that TOs enjoy numerous possibilities for anti-competitive behavior and they thus have to be subjected to stricter regulatory regimes than the manufacturers of electronic equipment. The regulatory powers that states, policy makers, and regulators enjoy correspond to qualities of the products they govern. It is the complicated nature of regulating networks competition which makes the IPR for network interconnection less effective than the IPR for terminal type-approval procedures. A regime's effectiveness thus reflect the characteristics of the policy problem as it reflects political interests.
Policy outcomes and regime structures may also be function of actors' styles of policy making. Styles of policy making are the standard operating procedures that actors adopt in implementing policies (Richardson, 1982) . Styles are usually explained in terms of the human tendency to act according to familiar routines. The literature of public policy and comparative public policy usually refers to the notion of style in the context of comparing national systems of policy making (e.g., Vogel, 1986; Waarden, 1992 Waarden, , 1995 . Different national styles were said to be distinct and also important in determining the timing, the direction, and the actual processes of policy making. May policy styles account for variations between the two international policy regimes? Although both were made possible by the close cooperation between the United States and the EU, the extent of influence that each of the parties had on them is not equal and therefore they are expected to exhibit different 'policy styles'. One of the most important contributions of the national styles approach is the distinction it draws between the adversarial relations of business and government in the United States and the more consensual and collaborative relations in Europe and Britain (Vogel, 1986; Wilks and Wright, 1987 Finally, it is possible to suggest that the structure of the two international policy regimes reflects 'policy learning' on the part of the two dominant actors, the European Union and the United States. The regulation of the network interconnection regime closely resembles the principles and the definition of the EU's and the US's own legislation (Holmes et al., 1996, 765; Bronckers and Larouche, 1997, 28) . The international terminal type-approval regime reflects, however, the learning-by-doing policy process of the EU as it can be seen as extension of the policy of mutual recognition as implemented in the process of European economic integration (see Majone, 1991; ). An important lesson that was implemented in the building of the international policy regime for typeapproval was to avoid harmonization of type-approval standards, testing, and certification. Adopting the mutual-recognition principle ensures that the difficulties that the European Commission faced when working towards harmonization will be avoided.
This may be used to explain why the European Union was the most dominant actor in the MRA while the US government took the lead in the case of the WTO negotiations.
III. Conclusions
Until recently, students of comparative politics and comparative public policy paid little attention to international regulatory policies (Vogel, 1995, viii) . The study of public policy was confined to the arena of 'national' or 'domestic' policy making, whereas the pressures, policies, and agreements in the international arena were perceived as either external constraints or opportunities for domestic policy makers. It is therefore not surprising that comparativists in political economy and public policy focused their attention on cross-national and cross-sectorial arenas, while leaving the comparative study of international institutions and international regimes to scholars of international relations. Yet, the internationalization of important arenas of domestic policy and the domestication of international politics call for a new division of labor between the formerly distinct disciplines of international relations and comparative politics. In this new division of labor, the arenas of common interest will be wider than they were ever before and comparative public policy will no longer be able to omit cross-international comparisons from its attention.
The variations between the regulatory tendencies of the network interconnection regime and the deregulatory tendencies of the terminal type-approval regime as well as the variations in their scope and effectiveness, seem to be significant enough to both (a)
provide the answers to the question concerning the factors and the actors that shape and maintain these new regimes, and (b) highlight the dynamics of political change. The contribution of comparative public policy here is to suggest that politics determines policy but also that policy determines politics. Government and business, as well as the characteristics of the specific policy problem, policy styles, and policy learning are all important factors in the shaping of the policy regimes. Combining these explanations can afford us a fair understanding of the governance of international policy regimes and contribute towards a balanced view of the dynamics of political change.
One thing that still deserves to be emphasized is that the role and the autonomy of the state do not necessarily follow the logic of the "retreat thesis". More international rules and more international competition, as the case of network interconnection demonstrated, are not necessarily incompatible. At the same time, more international rules do not necessarily constrain the state, as they can legitimate its roles in new and old arenas of action. These conclusions are particularly important in regard to the study of telecommunications. Much of the importance of telecommunications as a case study derives not from its growing economic importance but from its features as a "critical case" for the "retreat of the state" thesis. Compared with any other sector in world economy, telecommunications has moved farthest and fastest. The road leading from a natural monopoly and a state administrated service to competitive markets run by global corporations that are busily and energetically engaged in mergers, take-overs, and joint ventures is impressive. Telecommunications has become the 'paradigmatic case' for those arguing the retreat of the nation-state. The example of network interconnection and distinguishing between autonomy and independence prove particularly problematic for this thesis.
As much as these two regimes can tell about the dynamics of change in the role and the goals of the post cold-war state, the efforts to ensure competitive environment are now no longer aimed only at the domestic environment but also at the international one. The competition state is becoming international in its effort to maximize the extent of competition. Because the task of ensuring competitive markets is often complex and difficult there is plenty of room for government regulations. The dynamics of the competition state may eventually prove that the aim of perfecting competition may result in more and more regulations. Full competition is a textbook situation, while real-life constraints create 'imperfect competition' 17 . Realizing this, regulators and policy makers often advance 'workable competition', namely competition that is tuned to the limitations of governance and social requirements (Whish, 1993, 10-11) . Because 'full competition' is an ideal, and because the more committed the state is for competition the more it will become stricter and demanding regarding business, the end of regulations seems to be far-fetched. Instead, like the old giant corporations that at a point seem to be doomed but often returned to life, we may have to deal with rather lean and mean competition state.
Notes
1 Terminal equipment refers to any end-line device that is used for telecommunications in combination with another end-line device. This definition subsumes such various equipment as telephone sets, fax machines, answering machines, mobile telephony, and Private Automated Branch Exchange (PABX). 3 Indeed, some areas of telecommunications are not governed by a regime at all. 4 Ironically, it was the divestiture of AT&T and the creation of the Bell Operating Companies in 1984 that complicated and constrained the ability of manufacturers to freely introduce their products into the markets. The fragmented system created independent TOs, which in turn put forward a number of "voluntary" standards. The American type-approval procedure becomes more complicated when terminal equipment, such as fax and answering machines, were submitted to high-voltage safety regulations. Radio equipment terminals are also subject to stricter approval procedures and the FCC developed mandatory technical standards which aim at preventing the interference of one equipment with another.
5 This estimation is approximated on data cited by two different interviewees: one is from the EU Commission, and the other a chairman of the European Association of Designated Laboratories and Notified Bodies (ADLNB).
6 If a current proposal for a directive of the Commission is approved by the Council and the Parliament, the type-approval process will be liberalized even more. According to the proposed directive, type-approval will only require the manufacturers' self-certification; their responsibility for the product will be ensured mainly through liability law.
